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Belgium is often cited as exemplary in the scope of its general anti-trafficking in human beings 
(THB) policy. It has adopted a broad definition of the crime of trafficking for labour exploitation as 
being the work or service conducted in conditions contrary to human dignity. The broad definition 
chosen and the fact that the coercion element is not compulsory but an aggravating circumstance 
allows for more convictions on grounds of THB and recommends Belgium as a good-practice 
example within the EU. 
There are relatively few documented cases of trafficking in the context of domestic work. The 
Social Inspectorate in Brussels Region, which has recorded the largest number of cases in this 
sector out of the three Belgian regions, identifies about five cases in private domestic work out of 
30 cases of potential THB for labour exploitation annually. A few other cases in the diplomatic 
environment are also possibly identified. Importantly, THB in domestic work, which is documented 
to be amongst the most severe and violent circumstances in labour exploitation, cannot be 
separated from a broader context of labour exploitation. 
There are hardly any measures explicitly addressing demand-side aspects. Some actions for 
raising awareness are foreseen in the National Action Plan to combat THB (2015-2019), while 
measures taken in the domain of regular domestic work at diplomatic and private households 
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contribute to better employment conditions for domestic workers. Undocumented domestic workers 
working in the shadow market, however, are still largely unprotected. 
The country study on Belgium suggests that workers’ vulnerability is one of the main factors 
influencing demand in labour exploitation in the domestic work sector. Employers’ preferences or 
recruitment agencies’ practices comes second. Vulnerability is largely characterized by the lack of 
migrant status or by a precarious temporary status. Structural factors, such as the current 
migration and employment policies, keep these workers unprotected in practice. 
Migration status is therefore a key issue. Building a regularisation path for undocumented domestic 
workers and/or guaranteeing access to labour and human rights to domestic workers 
independently of their migrant status is critical for avoiding cyclic labour exploitation in the domestic 
work sector. 
Evidence from national law-cases equally demonstrates that vulnerability factors can arise from the 
kind of work relationship established in domestic work, in particular when workers are live-in (i.e. 
residing in the household of the employer). Raising the awareness of employers, workers, and 
general public can help reduce domestic workers’ vulnerability as well as the risk of labour 
exploitation and THB. 
Protection and prevention measures, moreover, are part of Belgian’s obligations under the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention on domestic workers (C189), which Belgium 
ratified in June 2015. The Convention establishes basic rights for all domestic workers and 
encourages States to go further than minimum standards. 
 
 
 
Evidence from the Belgian case shows that among the main obstacles to preventing exploitative 
situations within the sector are the migration and employment policies that apply to domestic 
work. Indeed, undocumented workers comprise the majority of THB victims in domestic work and, 
as shown by research, their vulnerability emanates mainly from the lack of protection of their rights 
as workers and human beings. Additionally, the lack of pathways to regularisation and the 
impossibility of migrating as a domestic worker reinforce the shadow market and, simultaneously, 
the ability of undocumented domestic workers to access their rights. Ergo the context of 
vulnerability has structural roots in national migration and employment policies. 
Additionally, the behaviour of employers, recurrent in general domestic work relationships but 
exacerbated in exploitative situations, prevents domestic work from being considered as work. This 
behaviour masks the employment situation and, consequently, the exploitation that comes with it. 
1) Migration and employment policies applying to domestic work 
Structural lack of protection of migrant domestic workers 
According to Belgian law, undocumented workers enjoy the same protection as any other workers 
with regards to labour rights. Many situations, however, prevent workers from fully enjoying their 
rights. 
For instance, claiming back wages is possible under law but hard to accomplish in practice: the 
procedure takes very long and the employment relationship is hard to prove. Chances of winning in 
the Courts are thus slim. In this context, mediation between domestic workers and 
employers/exploiters is a good practice, but this conflict-solving method is optional and not always 
accepted by employers/exploiters1. 
                                                          
1
 The word “employer/exploiter” was chosen to name the category of perpetrators of labour exploitation or THB in 
domestic work. 
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Voucher service policy as an anti-THB 
measure in the demand aspect? 
Since the 2000s, Belgium has a service 
voucher system allowing households to 
purchase weekly cleaning services from 
authorised companies at the subsidised price 
of €9 per hour while benefiting from a tax 
deduction (2016). 
Some anti-THB stakeholders, international 
organisations, as well as national and 
international trade unions, consider the service 
voucher policy as a good practice in the 
domestic worker sector. Further, some 
stakeholders see it as indirectly tackling 
demand in the context of potential situations of 
labour exploitation in domestic work. 
It is broadly accepted that the system brings 
improvements to job quality compared to the 
informal sector, mainly due to the recognition 
of labour rights and a work status, as well as 
the introduction of an intermediary actor. The 
voucher system also opens the possibility of 
being unionised, and collective agreements 
are responsible for positive changes within this 
expanding sector. But it seems excessive to 
call it an indirect alternative measure for 
reducing THB in domestic work, for two main 
reasons:  
Firstly, only nationals or migrants with a 
regular stay permit can join the system, while 
the main THB victims in the domestic work 
sector are mostly undocumented migrants. 
Secondly, the profiles of service voucher 
clients and employers/exploiters in THB in 
domestic work are markedly different. It is 
possible, though, that “normal” arrangements 
of domestic work employment shift towards 
labour exploitation. 
We therefore suggest that it is not the 
existence of the service voucher policy but, on 
the contrary, precisely the inexistence of 
formal employment arrangements for live-in 
domestic workers in private households that 
constitutes a main factor contributing to 
increase workers’ vulnerability and the risk of 
labour exploitation and THB in domestic work. 
Another problem arises from the constraints of the 
Social inspectorate mandate under migration law. 
Inspectors are crucial actors in the protection of 
workers and in detecting THB cases in domestic 
work. However, they are simultaneously responsible 
for denouncing undocumented migrants irregularly 
working on Belgian soil (infraction of the social 
criminal law). 
Thus, domestic workers found by social inspections 
in a situation of labour exploitation can be expelled 
from the country due to their migration status, 
unless these individuals are identified as victims of 
trafficking. In the event workers file a complaint at 
the Social Inspectorate Office (under these 
circumstances they do not risk an "order to leave the 
territory"), the situation will no longer be a flagrante 
delicto and they will lack the evidence that an 
inspection could bring, thus reducing the chances of 
redress. 
Compared to other traditional migrant occupations, 
domestic workers lodge relatively few complaints. 
Migrant workers refrain from filing a complaint out of 
fear of losing their job, or of retaliation (in Belgium or 
in their country of origin), or of being arrested or 
expelled, etc. Additionally, as domestic workers find 
new jobs mainly through the employers’ network, 
filing a complaint may prevent them for finding jobs 
through informal recommendation. Existing 
remedies in Belgium thus fail to provide effective 
access to justice. 
A regular status, however, does not necessarily 
protect from labour exploitation. In addition, certain 
types of residence status may actually exacerbate 
vulnerability to exploitation. The S card (diplomatic 
domestic workers) and the work permit B (in the rare 
cases it is given to live-in domestic workers in 
private houses) link a work contract to the stay 
permit and may be annually renewed. Domestic 
workers are thus, in practice, bound to their 
employers. This dependency drastically limits their 
bargaining power, preventing them from leaving 
exploitative situations, filing a complaint against the 
employer, or even claiming their rights from their 
employers. 
In the field of domestic work in diplomatic 
households, Belgium has launched a number of 
initiatives in recent years. The Service of the 
Protocol has for instance increased its attention to 
the risk of domestic workers’ exploitation; in 2013, a 
Commission for Good Offices was created with the 
goal of mediating conflicts and addressing loopholes regarding workers’ protection. These 
measures are nevertheless insufficient for protecting the rights of domestic workers in diplomatic 
households due to the structural factors enumerated above. To be able to maintain their job and 
stay permit, some domestic workers may undergo labour exploitation and possibly violence. 
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Migration for domestic work: A demand not addressed, an unprotected migration 
There seems to be a persistence of informal arrangements in domestic work, particularly when 
considering full-time and/or live-in workers. Indeed, employers —who in this case are a family—
consider the existing domestic employee status as too bureaucratic and expensive in terms of tax 
and social charges. Moreover, this status is modelled on a 1970s’ type of full-time domestic work 
and offers much poorer work conditions than those enjoyed by, say, service voucher employees. 
In this vein, given the inadequacy and little use of the domestic employee status, one option for 
consideration could be to eliminate it. But demand for this kind of employment cannot be totally 
transferred to the current service voucher system: under the latter, live-in domestic work is not 
allowed and the number of purchased hours and tasks are limited (maximum of about 22 hours per 
week and no caring or outdoor chores are permitted). Moreover, expanding a heavily-subsidised 
system to wealthier families able to afford a full-time domestic worker seems questionable. 
Thus, there is a share of demand for full-time and live-in domestic workers that is not met by the 
national regular market. Even when employers are willing to employ a worker under the domestic 
employee status, they have a hard time finding someone meeting their specifications. Many 
employers, who are private households, try to have the immigration status of their undocumented 
employee regularised. But currently there is almost no pathway for these workers’ regularisation 
outside general regularisation campaigns. 
The Belgian government does not consider domestic work as a labour shortage sector and 
officially there is no possibility for migrating to Belgium as domestic worker (except in case 
employers are diplomats and, rarely, under a work permit B for live-in workers). This decision is at 
odds with the reality of the domestic work market.  
The current policy and legal framework may lead to employers turning to the informal market—
whether workers are undocumented migrants or EU citizens (some employers may nevertheless 
inappropriately use the voucher system to employ a full-time domestic worker). Domestic work is 
therefore a “migrant job”, a situation that the financial crisis of recent years has not challenged. 
Consequently, opening paths to, on the one hand, regular domestic workers' migration and, on the 
other hand, regularisation for undocumented domestic workers already working in the domestic 
work sector, would represent a gain in terms of tax earnings and labour market control. The service 
voucher experience demonstrates that a declared labour market is more easily controlled. 
Furthermore, these initiatives can result in greater protection of domestic workers’ rights. 
2) Employer/Exploiter’s behaviour 
Employers/exploiters are found among all nationalities and social classes. None of them, according 
to case-law analysis and frontline professionals, acknowledge or recognize their own responsibility 
regarding the criminal acts of exploitation of which they are accused. The family-like environment 
overshadows the work relationship, even in very exploitative situations. Consequently, 
employers/exploiters do not see themselves as such and do not assume that they are the ones 
responsible by providing adequate conditions of work and living. 
According to frontline professionals, employers/exploiters’ discourse is often premised on a 
humanitarian rhetoric, relying on the perception that the domestic worker is “needy” therefore 
giving work and board is an opportunity to take them out of poverty. 
Furthermore, the worker is often of different nationality/ethnic background, has different migration 
status (or none), enjoys a lower status in the family (when they pertain to the same extended 
family), or comes from a less-privileged class background than the employer/exploiter. These 
factors limit the employer/exploiter’s empathy towards the worker’s living and working conditions. 
The status difference, even if it is subtle, reinforces social distance and helps dehumanise workers 
in employers/exploiters’ eyes: they do not identify with workers, who appear to them as the 
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“naturally” suitable persons for doing all the domestic work. Both case analysis and interviews with 
migrant domestic workers and migrant organisations show that the fact of being undocumented 
can make the workers appear less entitled to the same level of working and living conditions. 
Moreover, the live-in situation blurs boundaries between work and free time. The worker then 
appears as permanently available, which is conducive to an increased volume of work delegated. 
Domestic work being invisible and employers/exploiters having assigned all tasks to workers, they 
do not “see” how much work is done and do not perceive the workers as overloaded with tasks. 
The specificity of the situation of live-in domestic work can also contribute to some employers’ 
seeking to widen their social distance from workers. 
Simultaneously, the social behaviour of searching for the “best deal” is equally at the origin of 
situations of exploitation. Employers/exploiters, as any consumer, seek more-for-less 
arrangements, moving away from empathy with the worker. This does not apply solely to domestic 
work, but also to all sectors of labour exploitation. 
Finally, the private aspect of the workplace allows the exploitative situation to be kept invisible from 
the public. It is thus less exposed to social inspection and, more broadly, to social control, 
favouring some situations of multiple and severe exploitation. 
All these factors, combined with the structural reasons mentioned above, may contribute to 
fostering demand for domestic work services in a context of severe exploitation or trafficking. 
 
 
 
Raising awareness among employers and the general public, as well as empowering workers to 
better understand the rights to which they are entitled, has the potential to bring positive outcomes 
in preventing THB and labour exploitation in domestic work. However, only the removal of 
structural barriers exacerbating individuals’ vulnerability to exploitation built into migration and 
employment laws will be able to bring efficient prevention to exploitation. It is not sufficient for 
workers to know their rights if they are not able to experience them in practice. 
1. The role of social inspectors  
 Sanction employers/exploiters, not migrant workers. Employers/exploiters evade 
tax contributions and take advantage of workers' situations. Undocumented workers are 
working without a work permit because it is impossible for them to do otherwise. 
 Give domestic workers who file a complaint against an abusive employer a temporary 
stay permit (not linked to any employer) that allows them to work during the 
proceedings. 
 Work more closely with migrants’ rights organisations to enlarge the Social 
Inspectorate’s scope in gathering information and preventing labour exploitation in 
domestic work. 
2. Fully adopting the exploitation continuum approach 
 Extend the mandate of the THB Platform to include all forms of severe labour 
exploitation aimed at narrowing the gap between THB and “not-so-exploited” victims of 
labour exploitation (see FRA 2015). 
 Develop access to justice and support: 
o Improve reclamation of back wages by reducing the burden of proof on workers 
to establish the employment relationship. 
o Improve psychological support and increase available places in shelters for 
victims of violence at work. 
 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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3. The need for a new migration and employment policy 
 Review the work permit system and shortage lists establishing clear criteria for 
employers seeking to engage workers from abroad while improving workers’ protection 
by disconnecting the stay permit from the work permit: allowing workers to change 
employer as well as a grace period to find another job at the end of their contract. This 
initiative has the advantage of bringing into the declared market a series of labour 
arrangements that are currently in the shadow economy, thus allowing an increase in 
control over employment relationships and tax contributions. 
 Consider domestic work as a labour shortage sector. The lack of legal admission 
categories for domestic workers contributes to undeclared arrangements and migrant 
domestic workers’ irregularity. 
 Develop/Consider a unified policy under a third-party employer (from the example 
of the voucher service system) for all types of domestic work statuses (service voucher 
employee, domestic employee, au pair, etc.). 
4. Empowering domestic workers 
 Reinforce support to migrant associations working with (all) migrants’ empowerment 
at the grassroots level. Migrant workers’ empowerment can prevent exploitative 
situations by developing workers’ skills to negotiate with employers, identify (and quit) 
exploitative situations, find support, and file complaints against employers/exploiters. 
 Enhanced access to free language classes for all migrants could strengthen their 
understanding of Belgian laws and their rights. 
5. Domestic work is work: Changing employers’ behaviour 
 Work on raising general public awareness with the double goal of reducing social 
acceptance of exploitation against migrants and moving away from the “more-for-
less” ideology steeped in occidental-capitalist people’s mindset: TV/radio campaign 
spots, material for debate in the schools, etc. 
 Distribute brochures on the main rules to be respected in case of domestic work 
employment in Belgium. Although this action is already planned in the 2015-2019 
National Plan for foreign employers/diplomats, the targeted public of the brochures 
should be enlarged to include not only migrant families but also families of all social 
classes and nationalities. 
6. Improving knowledge of the domestic work sector 
 Further knowledge, mainly on the informal domestic work sector, is needed to inform 
policymaking. How many domestic workers are there in Belgian households? Under 
which migration and labour status do they work? What nationalities are they? What are 
their global living and working situations? Although these questions are hard to answer 
in a sector in which informal labour persists and might be significant, future research 
could provide an overview of the situation. 
 
 
 
This national study is part of the DemandAT country studies on trafficking in human beings (THB) 
in the domestic work sector conducted in seven European countries: Belgium, France, Greece, 
Cyprus, Italy, Netherlands, and UK.  
 
The key objectives of research were to i) investigate types of situations in domestic work that may 
involve extreme forms of exploitation and trafficking, ii) examine the motivations and factors driving 
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and shaping the demand as well as iii) examine the gaps in legislations and policies.  
The case study is mainly based on interviews with Belgian anti-THB policy stakeholders, trade 
union representatives, NGOs in the migration field and judicial professionals. A total of 14 semi-
structured interviews were held with 16 interviewees between March and July 2015 in English and 
French (quotes translated by the author). The research is also drawn on the analysis of existing 
grey literature, case-law analysis and academic articles, mainly regarding migrant domestic work 
and THB for labour exploitation. Desk research on a selection of national cases-law complemented 
the national case study, as well as an interview with a recognised THB victim. 
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